
























































   
    his article will examine the question of whether the right of self-defense 
under contemporary international law permits a State to react to an immi-
nent or potential armed attack carried out by digital means in two circum-
stances.  First, as an attack occurring in conjunction with, or as an adjunct 
to, a conventional kinetic armed attack intended to neutralize the target 
State’s defensive and command and control systems. Second, as an at-
tack—independent of any use of kinetic force—intended to cause signifi-
cant human casualties, physical damage or large-scale disruption in the tar-
get State. While the former scenario is probably considerably more likely 
than the latter scenario, both will receive attention. The applicable law is 
the same in either scenario, although there are some potentially significant 
differences in the modalities of its application, primarily in the identifica-
tion of the attacking party and in gauging the level of the response if an 
attack was conducted wholly in the digital domain.  
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A. Starting Points 
 
This article assumes a number of issues are “givens” for the purposes of 
this discussion.  
First, that any use of force at the international level is, as a matter of 
law, governed by the international law on the use of force, irrespective of 
the manner in which the force is conducted and carried out.1 
Second, while the use of force in the cyber context poses certain chal-
lenges in how and when the existing legal framework regulating the use of 
force can be applied, it is capable, in principle, of being applied to any type 
of force that can be qualified as such.  Consequently, that it can be applied 
to computer-based attacks just as it can be applied to other forms of both 
kinetic and non-kinetic force, such as bacteriological, radiological and 
chemical weapons, whether used in conventional warfare or in terrorist as-
saults.2 While the specific characteristics of cyber attack differ in some im-
portant respects from conventional kinetic attack and most forms of what 
is loosely referred to as “cyber attack” do not qualify as either a use of 
force or armed attack, those that do cause—or are intended to cause—
significant loss of life, physical destruction or long-term disruption of a 
State’s vital infrastructure could constitute an armed attack. Hence, the 
contemporary legal framework is applicable as a matter of law and poten-
tially relevant in the cyber context. There are neither legal nor practical rea-
sons to assume that the existing international legal framework governing 
the use of force in the cyber realm is irrelevant, inadequate or incapable of 
being applied without clear and convincing evidence so indicating.  
Third, there are no separate rules and legal principles for the use of 
force in the cyber context. Therefore, notions such as “use of force,” 
“armed attack,” “necessity,” “immediacy” and “proportionality” are no dif-
ferent in the cyber context than in the physical world, although the modali-
ties of their application might well differ to some extent. Likewise, the rules 
relating to attribution of an attack to a particular State or non-State entity 
                                                                                                                      
1. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 39 (July 8). 
2. Paul Ducheine, Joop Voetelink, Jan Stinissen & Terry Gill, Towards a Legal Frame-
work for Military Cyber Operations, in CYBER WARFARE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 101 (Paul 











do not cease to be applicable when the attack is carried out by cyber 
means.3  
Fourth, self-defense of States at the international level is relevant only 
to unlawful uses of force originating outside a State’s territory that rise to 
the level of an armed attack. This means that any other type of activity, 
whether it involves a degree of force below this threshold or constitutes 
criminal conduct or a violation of other national or international legal rules 
not related to the use of force, falls outside the scope of those actions to 
which States may respond in self-defense. Therefore, cyber criminal activi-
ty, cyber (corporate) espionage and various other forms of unauthorized 
penetration, theft of data and sabotage of computer systems, whether pub-
lic or private, that do not fit within the definition of armed attack are not 
subject to the law relating to self-defense and will not be addressed in this 
article. Such activities may well constitute unlawful intervention or other 
violations of international and national law, but the violations do not give 
rise to the right of self-defense when carried out in the physical world. 





Section II will set out the essential nature and purpose of the right of self-
defense, and examine its scope and the legal conditions governing its exer-
cise under both the UN Charter and customary international law. Since the 
law regulating the use of force and the exercise of the right of self-defense 
are taken to be applicable, relevant and based upon the same rules, condi-
tions and principles in the cyber context as in the physical domain, it is es-
sential to set out this legal framework as clearly and succinctly as possible 
in order to determine the conditions and modalities of the exercise of self-
defense. In particular the legality of anticipatory self-defense under con-
temporary international law is reviewed. To the extent that anticipatory 
self-defense is permitted or, alternatively, seen as lacking a legal basis with-
in the right of self-defense in general, this will be relevant to its possible 
application in responding to an imminent cyber armed attack.  
                                                                                                                      
3. This is the approach taken by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its Nuclear 
Weapons advisory opinion, supra note 1, ¶¶ 37–50, 244–47, and unanimously by the Group 
of Experts responsible for the TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLI-













Following this summary of the current legal framework regulating the 
use of force and the exercise of self-defense, we turn in Section III to its 
application in the cyber context. The modalities of a cyber armed attack 
will first be examined. We will then look into the particular challenges of 
applying the legal framework governing the exercise of self-defense, in par-
ticular anticipatory self-defense, in the cyber context. While the applicable 
law is the same, there are specific challenges and modalities involved in ap-
plying it to the cyber context, principally, in situations when cyber weapons 
are employed in the absence of more traditional kinetic force. In such situa-
tions, the challenges posed include ascertaining the source of the attack and 
identity of the attacker, determining potential consequences of the attack 
and gauging the response in terms of necessity, immediacy and proportion-
ality. 
In Section IV, we draw a number of conclusions and provide a clear 
answer to the question of whether anticipatory action in self-defense would 
be a legal response, and, to the extent it is, what conditions and limitations 
of a general and specific nature are relevant. 
 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE EXERCISE OF THE  
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE.  
 
This section will first deal with the essence and legal basis of self-defense 
and then discuss the criteria pertaining to it as found in the UN Charter 
and customary international law. 
 
A. Essence and Dual-Legal Basis of Self-Defense 
 
The right of self-defense under international law is the right of a State to 
repel or, if necessary, overcome an unlawful use of force amounting to an 
armed attack.4 That is what characterizes it and sets it apart from other uses 
of force, whether lawful (e.g., action undertaken by or with the authoriza-
tion of the UN Security Council to maintain or restore international peace 
and security or as a law enforcement measure in the domestic legal con-
                                                                                                                      
4. See Terry D. Gill, Legal Basis of the Right of Self-Defence under the UN Charter and under 
Customary International Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILI-











text), or unlawful (e.g., uses of force that do not have a recognized legal 
basis).5 
Self-defense is both an inherent right of States under customary interna-
tional law and an exception to the prohibition on the use of force as laid 
out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The inclusion of the right of self-
defense within the Charter had and has a dual purpose: recognition of the 
preexisting right of States under customary international law and integra-
tion of the right of self-defense into the Charter system of collective securi-
ty in order to provide an unequivocal basis for collective self-defense.6 Any 
legal assessment of self-defense must take into account the Charter’s sub-
stantive and procedural requirements, as well as the criteria for the exercise 
of this right under customary international law.  
The two sources are complementary, and in no way conflict with each 
other when applied with this understanding. The starting point for any in-
terpretation of how they interact is to examine the Charter text, consider-
ing, when necessary, the intentions of the drafters, as well as the object and 
purpose of the entirety of Charter provisions related to the use of force 
and the maintenance of international peace and security. Additionally, the 
nature and conditions of self-defense under customary international law are 
crucial to a correct interpretation and application of the right, since the 
Charter both recognizes its customary nature and does not seek to supplant 
or override the conditions laid down in customary law, except in so far as 
explicitly provided for in the Charter. The Charter drafters did not set out 
to recast the right of self-defense from scratch; instead they recognized the 
existence of the right and embedded it in the Charter system. This means 
that the right as it existed at the time the Charter came into force is the 
                                                                                                                      
5. The legal character of self-defense is set out and analyzed in D. W. BOWETT, SELF-
DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–25 (1958); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 251 (1963); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION 
AND SELF- DEFENCE 187–93 (5th ed. 2012); and C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use 
of Force by Individual States in International Law, 41 RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 455–68 (1952). 
With regard to the premise that self-defense is a lawful response to unlawful force, see 
DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 190 (quoting the decision of the U.S. Military Tribunal in Unit-
ed States v. Ernst von Weizsäcker et al., 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NU-
ERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 329 (1949)). 
6. The inclusion of Article 51 in the UN Charter came at a relatively late stage in the 
negotiations leading to the Charter’s adoption. It was added at the behest of Latin Ameri-
can States, which wanted to safeguard the right of mutual assistance arrangements in the 
event of attack. See BOWETT, supra note 5, at 182–83; LELAND GOODRICH, EDVARD 
HAMBRO & ANNE SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 342–44 (1969); Waldock, 













right that is referred to as “inherent” in Article 51. In the absence of clear 
evidence to the contrary, there is no reason to assume that there was any 
intention to substantially alter the content of the right of self-defense in 
either the text of the Charter itself or in the negotiations leading to the in-
corporation of the right into the Charter. Therefore, since the Charter is 
silent on many aspects of the content of the right, an assessment of an in-
vocation of self-defense must take into account the conditions contained in 
the Charter and customary law, as well as the factual considerations sur-
rounding its invocation.7 
 
B. Conditions Laid Out in the Charter 
 
1. Armed Attack 
 
The Charter predicates the exercise of the right of self-defense on the oc-
currence of an “armed attack.” We will also examine the temporal dimen-
sion of an armed attack (that is, at what point in time does it occur), but for 
now we will concentrate on the question of what is an armed attack.  
The Charter provides little or no guidance as to what constitutes an 
armed attack. To ascertain its meaning, we must look for guidance to cus-
tomary law and supplementary sources, such as international jurisprudence. 
Based on these, an armed attack is considered to be a use of force originat-
ing outside the target State’s territory that rises above the level of a small-
scale, isolated armed incident or criminal activity, and which is directed 
against a State’s territory, its military vessels or aircraft in international wa-
ters or airspace or lawfully present in another State’s territory, or, in certain 
situations directed against its nationals located abroad.8 It could also in-
                                                                                                                      
7. The dual-legal basis of self-defense and the complementary relationship of the 
Charter and customary law were acknowledged by the ICJ in its Nicaragua decision. See 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
¶ 94 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment]. The continued relevance of a preexisting 
rule of customary law in the absence of evidence of the emergence of a newer one regulat-
ing the same issue follows from general legal methodology and the doctrine of interpreta-
tion of legal sources. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–
4 (4th ed. 1990); 1 R.Y. JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIMS’S INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 25–26 (9th ed. 1992); Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in 7 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61–62 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2003). 
8. The requirement that an armed attack originate from a source located or controlled 
outside a State’s territory is generally acknowledged and non-controversial, as are the listed 











clude a non-kinetic attack involving a use of force that resulted in more 
than nominal human casualties, or significant physical damage or destruc-
tion to either military or civilian objects.  
Additionally,  an armed attack could arguably include a cyber attack di-
rected against a State’s critical infrastructure, provided the cyber attack had 
the potential to severely cripple a State’s ability to carry out and ensure the 
conducting of essential State functions or severely undermine its economic, 
political and social stability for a prolonged period of time. A number of 
States have adopted this position in their national cyber security strategies 
and many experts concur that an attack of this nature could potentially 
amount to a use of force rising to the level of an armed attack, although 
opinion is sharply divided.9  
                                                                                                                      
State´s nationals located abroad. The latter is controversial, with some authorities rejecting 
the position that an attack against a State’s nationals abroad constitutes an armed attack, 
while others take the view that protection of nationals falls within the customary right of 
self-defense.  There is a middle view which accepts that if nationals of a State are the tar-
get of threats to their lives or physical safety in order to obtain concessions or a change of 
policy from their parent State, this can constitute an armed attack. These views and the 
present authors’ position are set out in Terry D. Gill & P.A.L. Ducheine, Rescue of Nationals 
Abroad, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, 
supra note 4, at 217–19. On armed attack generally, see TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” 
AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRAC-
TICE (2010). 
9. The cyber strategies of several nations acknowledge the possibility of treating an at-
tack that results in human casualties and/or significant physical damage as an armed attack 
justifying the exercise of self-defense. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, Cyberspace 
Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, at 4, 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/docs/NDAASection
934Report_Forwebpage.pdf. The Advisory Council on International Affairs and the 
Committee on Issues of Public International Law in the Netherlands issued a 2011 joint 
report, “Cyber Warfare,” that was adopted by the Netherlands Government.  In this re-
port, both a digital attack with comparable effects to those of a traditional kinetic attack 
and an attack upon critical infrastructure that produces severe and long-term effects were 
deemed as potentially triggering the right of self-defense. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON IN-
TERNATIONAL AFFAIRS & ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, CYBER WARFARE 21 (2011), available at http://www.aiv-
advies.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/doc/webversie__AIV77CAVV_22_ENG.pdf. In the 
Group of Experts that prepared the Tallinn Manual, there was unanimity that a cyber at-
tack with comparable scale and effects to that of a kinetic attack which results in human 
casualties and physical damage or destruction could constitute an armed attack. The ex-













In that regard, it must be pointed out that there is currently insufficient 
State practice and official policy statements to conclude with certainty that 
an attack of this nature would amount to an armed attack in the absence of 
potential loss of life, physical injury or property damage. In the opinion of 
the authors, such an attack could so qualify under certain conditions. If the 
attack caused either physical damage or human injury of any significance, it 
would definitely so qualify. Additionally, even in the absence of physical 
injury or damage it could, in our opinion, constitute an armed attack, pro-
vided the potential disruption of a State’s essential functions or stability 
was severe, long-term and incapable of being remedied within a reasonable 
time period. 
An armed attack can be conducted in various ways, ranging from full-
scale invasion to a series of small-scale uses of force conducted by the same 
author against the same target State that are reasonably connected in geo-
graphic and temporal terms and constitute what is, in effect, a phased 
armed attack.10  
Some of these modes of attack are more relevant in the cyber context 
than others. This will receive further attention in a subsequent section. 
 
2. Authorship of Armed Attack 
 
There is general agreement that the potential authors of an armed attack 
include a State’s armed forces and organized armed groups acting under 
the control of a State.  Mere political or ideological sympathy, or diplomat-
ic, logistical or material support for the organized armed group would not, 
in principle, constitute the requisite level of State involvement to be con-
sidered participation in the attack.  If, however, a State’s material or logisti-
cal support was substantial, it could potentially reach that level.11  
                                                                                                                      
effects, even one resulting in severe long-term disruption to critical infrastructure, could 
constitute an armed attack. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, cmt. to rule 13, ¶¶ 6–9. 
10. This is often referred to as the “accumulation of events” theory.  It is also referred 
to as a “pin-prick” armed attack or “Nadelstichtaktik.” See, e.g., Yehuda Z. Blum, State Re-
sponse to Acts of Terrorism, 19 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (1976); 
Paul Ducheine & Eric Pouw, Operation Change of Direction: A Short Survey of the Legal Basis 
and the Applicable Legal Regimes, in NETHERLANDS ANNUAL REVIEW OF MILITARY STUD-
IES—COMPLEX OPERATIONS: STUDIES ON LEBANON (2006) AND AFGHANISTAN (2006–
PRESENT) 51, 61–63 nn. 49–82 (Michiel de Weger et al. eds., 2009). 
11. Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 7, ¶¶ 195, 103. The views of one of the present au-
thors on substantial involvement are set out in P.A.L. Ducheine & E.H. Pouw, Legitimizing 











In addition to these two uncontroversial categories, there is increasing 
acceptance that an armed attack is capable of being carried out by an armed 
group not under the control of a State, but which instead acts autonomous-
ly with greater or lesser degrees of State tolerance and support that fall 
short of control or even influence.12 Although some legal experts and court 
decisions cast doubt on whether such a group could carry out an armed 
attack, the better opinion in our view is that there are good grounds for not 
ruling out this possibility. Nothing in the Charter text relating to self-
defense excludes it and this possibility has long been recognized in custom-
ary international law. There is also considerable recent State and interna-
tional practice supporting this proposition and a wide degree of acceptance 
on the part of legal experts. More to the point is the fundamental consider-
ation that the basic purpose of self-defense is to ward off armed attack. 
There are no compelling reasons to rule out the right of a State to exercise 
self-defense in the face of the clear ability of a number of armed groups to 
conduct an armed attack that is comparable in scale and effects to attacks 
conducted directly or indirectly by States.13 
                                                                                                                      
AFGHANISTAN 33, 40 (Rober Beeres et al. eds., 2012) and Ducheine & Pouw, supra note 
10, at 67–69. 
12. See Ducheine & Pouw, Legitimizing the Use of Force, supra note 11, at 39. 
13. The UN Security Council implicitly recognized this possibility in Resolutions 1368 
and 1373 by referring to “the inherent right of self-defense.”  S.C. Res. 1368, pmbl., U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 
28, 2001). Following the 9-11 attacks, NATO and the Organization of American States 
also recognized that attacks by armed groups could give rise to the right of self-defense.  
See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic 
Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm; 
Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Res. 1, Twenty-Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs Acting as Organ of Consultation In Application of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sept. 21, 
2001). The ICJ cast doubt on whether an armed attack conducted by an armed group gave 
rise to the right of self-defense in the absence of State support in its advisory opinion on 
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9), and its judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19).  The latter decision was 
met, however, with vigorous criticism by a number of the judges in their separate opin-
ions. A large number of recognized authorities believe an armed attack being conducted 
by a non-State entity in the absence of State control can give rise to the right of self-
defense.   See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 227–30; Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to 
Transnational Terrorism under the Jus ad Bellum, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CON-
FLICT: EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES—ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF YORAM DINSTEIN 157 













3. Requirements Related to the Security Council 
 
In addition to the requirement of an armed attack, the Charter stipulates 
that actions of self-defense may only be carried out until such time as the 
Security Council has undertaken the measures necessary to restore interna-
tional peace and security. This is the concrete manifestation of the primary 
purpose for including the right of self-defense in the Charter. It was not to 
definitively codify—much less invent—this long existing right, but rather 
to integrate it into the Charter system of collective security and provide a 
secure legal basis for collective self-defense treaty arrangements. The 
Council exercises primacy in the realm of the maintenance and restoration 
of international peace and security as reflected in, inter alia, Article 51 of the 
Charter.  
Additionally, a procedural requirement to report measures of self-
defense to the Council at the earliest possible opportunity is incorporated 
into this provision. It should be stressed that the requirement of reporting 
to the Council does not translate into a requirement to obtain prior author-
ization to exercise the right. Likewise, not just any action undertaken by the 
Security Council has the effect of terminating the right of a State to exer-
cise self-defense. Only measures that are necessary (implying effectiveness 
when read in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Charter) to restore peace 
and security and that are explicitly intended to terminate the exercise of the 
right by a State will have such effect.14 It is the Council that decides wheth-
er the measures it has taken are sufficient to remove the necessity of exer-
cising self-defense, but in the absence of an explicit intention expressed by 
the Council, for example, in the form of a cease and desist order, there is 
                                                                                                                      
are set out in more detail in Terry D. Gill, The Temporal Dimension of Self-Defense Anticipation, 
Pre-emption, Prevention and Immediacy, in id. at 113, 118. The essential reason giving rise to the 
possibility of responding in self-defense to an armed attack conducted by a non-State enti-
ty operating from the territory of a host State lies in the duty of States under international 
law to prevent their territory from being used to carry out actions that violate the rights of 
other States, including, in particular, the right to territorial inviolability and integrity. This 
duty of due diligence is part of customary law and was recognized, inter alia, in the Island of 
Palmas arbitral award (Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.I.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1928)) and by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel judgment. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 
I.C.J. 4, 22–23 (Apr. 9). 











no presumption that measures taken by the Council have the effect of ter-
minating the right of self-defense in and of themselves.15 
 
C. Conditions Laid Out in Customary International Law 
 
Because self-defense has, as we have seen, a dual-legal basis, it is clear 
that it must conform to the conditions laid out in both sources. Under cus-
tomary law, any exercise of self-defense must be carried out in a manner 
consistent with the principles of necessity, proportionality and immediacy.  
These were formulated in the diplomatic exchanges following the well-
known 1837 Caroline incident, which has been described by Jennings as the 
locus classicus of the law of self-defense.16 There is no mention of these prin-
ciples in Article 51 for the simple reason that, as previously noted, it was 
not intended to comprehensively codify the law relating to self-defense.  
These criteria are of a customary nature and complement the requirements 






                                                                                                                      
15. The primacy of the Council is evident from the text of Article 51, which, when 
read in conjunction with Articles 24 and 1, sets out the Council’s authority in the mainte-
nance of peace and the fundamental purpose of the Charter—the maintenance and resto-
ration of international peace and security through effective collective measures. See DIN-
STEIN, supra note 5, at 238–39; Waldock, supra note 5, at 495–96; ROSALYN HIGGINS, 
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 239–40 (1994). In 
Security Council Resolution 598, the Council ordered both parties to the Iran-Iraq War to 
stand down. S.C. Res. 598, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (July 20, 1987). In contrast, in Res-
olution 1373, supra note 13, the Council adopted a whole range of mandatory measures 
not involving the use of force aimed at combating international terrorism, while at the 
same time affirming the right of self-defense in connection with the armed attack of 9-11. 
In the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operations of 1990–91, the right of self-defense con-
tinued to operate alongside—and was ultimately subsumed into—the collective measures 
adopted by the Security Council in Resolutions 660–678 (1990). 
16. R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 82, 92 (1938). For a discussion of the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality and their distinct meanings in the ius ad bellum, as opposed to their meaning in the 
context of other branches of the law, such as the law of armed conflict, see, e.g., JUDITH 
GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 10 (2004). 
See also DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 231–33; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 















Necessity in the context of self-defense requires the existence of an armed 
attack that is ongoing or imminent and for which no other feasible alterna-
tive response exists.  
An attack can be a single large-scale attack or a series of related small-
scale attacks from the same source, which together form a single attack.  It 
can also be a manifestly imminent attack in the proximate future, a point to 
which we will return below. 
Alternatives can include measures short of self-defense when these are 
available. In the context of attacks by non-State actors, this includes exer-
cising law enforcement measures whenever this is feasible and provides an 
adequate response.  This is of particular importance with regard to a possi-
ble cyber armed attack conducted by a non-State actor with a greater or 
lesser degree of organization operating from a territory where the govern-
ment is both willing and able to conduct or permit an effective law en-
forcement response.  When the Security Council implements effective col-
lective measures, the right of self-defense can be complemented by such 
measures, subsumed into them, or the right can be terminated when the 
Council so directs. A clearly expressed willingness to cease an attack, in-
cluding compliance with ceasefire/withdrawal orders by the Security Coun-
cil, coupled with adequate measures to ensure non-repetition and a willing-
ness to conclude a comprehensive settlement of outstanding issues by 
peaceful means can also constitute an alternative to continued exercise of 
the right of self-defense.17  
It should be emphasized that seeking or obtaining prior consent does 
not in general or as a matter of law form part of the principle of necessity. 
If an attack is ongoing (or as we will argue more extensively below is im-
minent), there is no requirement to obtain prior consent to exercise the 
right of self-defense. If an attack has not yet materialized, there is no neces-
sity and, therefore, no right to exercise self-defense.  
When armed attacks are being conducted by a non-State actor operat-
ing from one State’s territory against another State and the non-State actor 
                                                                                                                      
17. Law enforcement measures are specifically and uniquely responses to attacks con-
ducted by non-State groups. They can provide a feasible alternative in situations where the 
State from which the attack originated has control over its territory and is willing to under-
take effective law means to address the threat. This would be the logical alternative to the 
use of trans-boundary armed force in self-defense. See the views of one of the present 











is neither under the control of the territorial State nor acting with its com-
plicity, remedial action should be taken by the State where the non-State 
actor is located.  This may take the form of adequate law enforcement 
measures or a proportionate recourse to armed force (either unilateral force 
or force used with the consent of the territorial State). If the territorial State 
consented, that consent would serve as a legal basis, in addition to or in 





Proportionality in the context of self-defense refers to the requirement that 
measures of self-defense must not exceed those required under the circum-
stances to repel the attack and prevent further attacks from the same 
source in the proximate future and that they must be roughly commensu-
rate to the scale and aims of the overall attack. Hence, the scale and nature 
of the attack will determine what is required to repel or, if necessary, over-
come it and prevent a continuation. A proportionate response to a single 
isolated armed attack would be measures to ward off the attack and pre-
vent any direct and immediate threat of repetition. For example, a warship 
targeted by an anti-ship missile fired from a shore-based installation could 
take measures to ward off the attack and neutralize the immediate source 
of the attack. A more substantial, but still relatively limited, attack against a 
State’s territory or military forces abroad would permit a response that 
warded off the immediate attack and forestalled repetition in the proximate 
future. A proportionate response to a full-scale armed attack, e.g., an inva-
sion or large-scale offensive strike, would be a defensive war aimed at de-
feating the attacking party and removing the threat of further aggression. 
Proportionality requires neither exact mathematical equivalency nor 
does it dictate the modality of exercising self-defense. If a digital attack ris-
es above the threshold of armed attack, the response may be to employ 
cyber weapons or kinetic force or a combination of the two to neutralize 
the attack, as long as the response did not exceed that required to repel the 
attack. Proportionality does not permit measures that would needlessly 
prolong or exacerbate the conflict.18  
                                                                                                                      
18. See the authorities cited supra note 16.  With regard to proportionality and the 
“accumulation of events” theory, discussed supra note 10 and accompanying text, see the 
report by Roberto Ago in his capacity as Special Rapporteur to the International Law 















Immediacy as a separate criterion for the exercise of self-defense refers to 
the requirement that self-defense measures, after taking the relevant cir-
cumstances into account, must not be unduly delayed. This requirement 
relates to the distinction between self-defense, which is a recognized legal 
basis for the use of force, and armed reprisal, which is unlawful under con-
temporary international law. Once an armed attack has occurred and the 
source of the attack determined, the defending State must proceed with its 
defensive measures as soon as it is capable of mounting a defense. This 
does not mean, however, that a response must necessarily be instantaneous 
to be lawful. A State will need to explore whether there are feasible alterna-
tives to the use of force in instances when it is not readily apparent that 
there are none.  It may need to deploy forces to the source of the attack, 
mobilize forces that are not in a state of instant readiness, consult with al-
lies and receive assistance in order to be able to respond, identify the at-
tacker when this is not readily evident. The latter requirement is particularly 
relevant in the cyber context, as well as in certain other types and modes of 
attack. The important point is that self-defense is exercised within a rea-
sonable timeframe in response to an ongoing attack or, as we will demon-
strate below, a clear threat of attack in the proximate future. It is not a pu-
nitive measure to be undertaken long after the attack has been carried out. 
A State does not, however, forfeit its right of self-defense because it is in-
capable of instantly responding or is uncertain of who is responsible for the 




In addition to the necessity, proportionality and immediacy principles, 
there must be credible evidence as to the identity of the attacking party and 
the source of the armed attack before measures in self-defense can be tak-
en. International law does not have a comprehensive set of universally rec-
ognized evidentiary standards to apply in determining whether a defensive 
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A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7 (1980). 
19. With respect to immediacy as a general criterion for the exercise of self-defense, 











response is permitted in situations where the identity and source of the at-
tack is not readily apparent.20  
In traditional attacks involving the armed forces of one State attacking 
the forces or territory of another State, the identity of the attacking party 
will usually be readily apparent. There was clearly no doubt of the identity 
of the attacking State at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the invading State in 
Kuwait in 1990. However, in situations where an armed group acts as ei-
ther a proxy of a State or on its own to carry out an armed attack or series 
of attacks, it may be less than clear who or what is behind the attack, par-
ticularly when the author of the attack denies involvement. The case law of 
the International Court of Justice in rejecting “suggestive” and “highly sug-
gestive” evidence seems to point to a stringent level of proof, but there is 
less than full agreement within the Court and the international community 
at large as to the accuracy of the standard it employs.21  
The requirements for evidence in the criminal justice system of most 
States and before international criminal tribunals would hardly be feasible 
or realistic when acting in self-defense.22 Nevertheless, there must be rea-
sonably credible and convincing evidence of involvement before a State 
can take measures in self-defense against a particular State or entity such as 
an armed group suspected of perpetrating an armed attack in instances 
where the identity of the attacker is not readily apparent. 
 
D. The Temporal Dimension: Anticipatory Self-Defense 
 
We will now turn to the question whether international law permits the ex-
ercise of measures of self-defense in response to an imminent or potential 
armed attack.  
Before presenting our views, it is necessary to clarify some terminology. 
In this article, the term “anticipatory self-defense” denotes defensive 
                                                                                                                      
20. The ICJ employed a stringent standard that rejected “suggestive” and “highly sug-
gestive” evidence of Iranian involvement in attacks on international shipping in the Per-
sian Gulf. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 59, 71 (Nov. 6). This and other 
aspects of the judgment were vigorously criticized by a number of judges in their individu-
al opinions. See id., ¶¶ 30–39 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id., ¶¶ 21–30 (separate 
opinion of Judge Kooijmans); id., ¶¶ 33–46 (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal); id., ¶¶ 
33–40 (separate opinion of Judge Owada). 
21. Id.  
22. There is no generally accepted “law of evidence” in international law. Standards 














measures undertaken in response to a manifest and unequivocal threat of 
attack in the proximate future. The term “preemptive self-defense” is synon-
ymous. The term “preventive self-defense” signifies a defensive response to 
an inchoate or potential threat of attack at some indeterminate point in the 
future.  
There is at present no universal consensus on the legality of either of 
these modes of exercising self-defense in advance of an actual attack. 23 It is 
nevertheless fair to say that the former mode (anticipatory or preemptive 
self-defense) enjoys widespread support among a significant number of 
States and in juridical opinion, while preventive self-defense is much more 
controversial.24 
In our view, anticipatory self-defense has long been recognized in cus-
tomary international law. The existence of an anticipatory element in self-
defense is, moreover, part of the essence of the right of self-defense in that 
forestalling continued attack, in addition to responding to an ongoing at-
tack, is part of the necessity and proportionality criteria that are integral 
elements of self-defense. In that sense, self-defense is both forward look-
ing, by securing the defending State from future attack, as well as reactive, 
by repelling an attack in progress. Any other rendition would leave a de-
fending State in an untenable and highly vulnerable position; one which, 
would put it in an unequal position vis-à-vis the attacking party. This neither 
makes sense nor does justice to the purpose underlying the right of self-
defense. 
The recognition of this anticipatory element can be traced back to the 
previously mentioned Caroline incident. In the diplomatic correspondence 
following that incident, the general conditions for the exercise of self-
defense, including its temporal dimension were set out. These were, in 
nineteenth century prose, “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelm-
ing and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”25 
                                                                                                                      
23. For a clear discussion of the controversy concerning the temporal aspect of self-
defense, see KINGA T. SZABO, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE 6–8 (2011).  
24. On the legality of preventive self-defense, see High-Level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 
2004); U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human 
Rights for All, U.N Doc. A/59/2005, 59th Sess., (Mar. 21, 2005). 
25. On the Caroline incident, see MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 53–54 (2003); BROWN-
LIE, supra, note 5, at 42–43; DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 197–98; THOMAS FRANCK, RE-
COURSE TO FORCE 97–98 (2002). The most authoritative article on the Caroline incident 
remains without doubt that by R.Y. Jennings, supra note 16. The primary source for in-











This formulation of the general conditions for the exercise of anticipatory 
self-defense is widely regarded as authoritative and has had a lasting influ-
ence, although not without a certain degree of divergence of opinion as to 
how literally the wording used should be taken. There is also disagreement 
among authorities and States as to whether it is a valid precedent and, even 
if it is, whether anticipatory self-defense is still lawful under the UN Char-
ter regime.  
This is not the place to delve into the historical value of the Caroline in-
cident in depth, but two points deserve attention.  First, it is sometimes 
argued that since Caroline took place in an era and under a legal regime in 
which war was lawful, it is of little relevance under the present day Charter 
legal regime in which not only war, but the use of force are prohibited, bar-
ring strict exceptions. This critique, it is submitted, is incomplete and, 
therefore, incorrect. While it is true that recourse to war was lawful in the 
nineteenth century legal order, the attack on the Caroline did not constitute 
a war.  The use of trans-boundary force below the threshold of war (often 
referred to as “measures short of war”) required a legal justification in the 
pre-Charter legal order. Acts involving a use of force that fell outside the 
legal context of a “state of war,” either declared or factual, such as various 
types of intervention, hot pursuit of armed bands over a frontier, pacific 
blockade and armed reprisal, were then regulated in international law—as 
they are now—although many of the legal rules relating to these uses of 
force were substantially different in the nineteenth century than they are 
under the Charter. Nevertheless, it is erroneous to conclude that because 
war was lawful in the international law of the nineteenth century, that legal 
justifications for using force were irrelevant.  
Nor is it convincing to argue that since the British action was directed 
against a non-State entity (groups of American nationals acting without 
U.S. sponsorship who sympathized with the rebellion taking place in Brit-
ish North America), it falls under the rubric of “state of necessity” rather 
than self-defense. The diplomatic correspondence referred to self-defense 
as the justification, not necessity, and it was viewed as such by both parties 
to the dispute.  More recently, the decisions of the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
tribunals held following the conclusion of World War II cited the Caroline 
incident in analyzing claims of self-defense by German and Japanese de-
fendants. Moreover, the critique reflects a position that self-defense can 
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pertain only to attacks conducted by a State or by an armed group under 
the control of a State: that interpretation was not the law then, nor does it, 
as discussed above, reflect current practice. Finally, notwithstanding signifi-
cant divergences between the nineteenth century law on the use of forcible 
measures short of war and the contemporary legal order, the principles of 
necessity, proportionality and immediacy, which were agreed to by both 
States in the Caroline incident, have not undergone significant transfor-
mation and are still of undisputed relevance today in the context of self-
defense, although the circumstances in which they are applied may have 
altered significantly in some situations.26 
Second, as regards the precedential value of the Caroline formula, it is 
undisputed that the references made to it in the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
trials reflect a conviction that it represented customary international law at 
the very time the Charter was drafted and entering into force.27 Without 
                                                                                                                      
26. On the nineteenth century law relating to the use of force short of war, see STE-
PHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY 156 (2005) and 
SZABO, supra note 23, at 69–77. The right of self-defense in the nineteenth century was 
related to both the natural law concept of “imperfect war” and the broader notion of self-
preservation. Szabo rightly points out that the nineteenth century notion of self-defense 
referred to in the Caroline incident included an intrinsic anticipatory element, therefore, 
there was no separate category of anticipatory self-defense at that time. Id. at 75. The opin-
ions of commentators as to the relevance of customary law and pre-Charter precedents, 
such as the Caroline incident, can be roughly divided into two schools. One, exemplified by 
such writers as BROWNLIE, supra  note 5, at 25; DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 188–89; and 
CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 86–88 (2000), largely 
or wholly discount the relevance of pre-Charter practice relating to self-defense because it 
took place in an era when recourse to force was not unlawful.  Others, such as BOWETT, 
supra note 5, at 269; FRANCK, supra note 25, at 45; and Waldock, supra note 5, at 455, take a 
wider view and consider pre-Charter practice as relevant.  
27. For the Nuremburg judgment on the relevance of the Caroline criteria to the Ger-
man plea of preventive self-defense in connection with its invasion of Norway, see 22 
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 448–50 (1948), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ Mili-
tary_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-XXII.pdf. For the assessment of the declaration of war by the 
Netherlands on Japan, see JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FAR EAST 379–84 (1946). The Japanese did not commence operations directly against 
the Netherlands East Indies until January 11, 1942, over a month after the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, because they first had to deal with American and British forces in the Philippines, 
Hong Kong and Malaya. The Tribunal pointed out that it was evident from the scale of 
the Japanese offensive across the Pacific and Southeast Asia that the Netherlands East 
Indies were going to be attacked as soon as it was practicable, and that, in fact, plans to 
that effect had been made prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Obviously, the plans were 











firm evidence that customary law has evolved in a different direction since 
then, there is no reason to assume the present legal regime no longer allows 
for some degree of anticipatory self-defense.28 Stated differently, if interna-
tional law relating to the exercise of self-defense in the period in which the 
Charter was adopted contained an anticipatory element, then the assump-
tion would be that it continues to exist, unless it could be conclusively 
shown that it had been subsequently altered, with the burden of proof rest-
ing on those who hold the law has changed.  
Certainly, more is required than simply stating that the wording of Arti-
cle 51 of the UN Charter, with its phrase “if an armed attack occurs,” cate-
gorically rules out anticipatory self-defense, since the wording itself sheds 
no light on either what constitutes an armed attack or when it can be said 
to have occurred. If one assumes an armed attack only occurs when a par-
ticular use of force physically passes an international boundary, there 
would, indeed, be no scope for anticipatory self-defense. However, this is 
not the only, nor necessarily the most convincing, interpretation of the 
meaning of the “occurrence” of an armed attack.  
In both the nineteenth century and at the time the Charter was adopt-
ed, armed attack was considered to include clear and manifest preparations, 
even the intention to attack in the proximate future, when their existence 
was supported by clear evidence. The Nuremburg Tribunal rejected the 
German defendants’ plea of self-defense as justifying the invasion of Nor-
way in April 1940, not because it rejected the possibility of preemption as 
such, but because the evidence clearly pointed to motives other than self-
defense. The Tribunal held that the basis for self-defense was lacking even 
though the Allies had contemplated a possible intervention in northern 
Norway to come to the assistance of Finland, which was being attacked by 
the Soviet Union at the time, and to interdict the shipment of Swedish iron 
ore to Germany, because Germans were not aware of these contingency 
plans when they carried out the invasion.  
                                                                                                                      
Dutch declaration of war enabled the formation of a joint defensive effort by U.S., British, 
Australian and Dutch forces in Southeast Asia.  The Tribunal deemed it to be defensive in 
character in accordance with the Caroline criteria in response to an aggressive war launched 
by Japan. For a chronology of the Japanese offensive against the Netherlands East Indies 
and the formation of the joint defense by the Allies, which culminated in the defeat of 
Dutch, U.S., Australian and UK naval forces in the Battle of the Java Sea and the comple-
tion of the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies by March 1942, see RICHARD E. 
DUPUY & TREVOR N. DUPUY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY 1132, 1138 
(2d ed. 1986). 













Likewise, the Tokyo Tribunal held the declaration of war by the Neth-
erlands against Japan immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which 
occurred well before the Japanese commenced military operations against 
the Dutch East Indies, did not give rise to a right of self-defense by Japan. 
It so held because it was evident that the scale of the Japanese offensive 
throughout the Pacific and East Asia was so comprehensive as to include 
the intention to capture the Dutch colony once it had been reached, after 
overcoming resistance elsewhere, in order to secure the valuable natural 
resources located there that were vital to the Japanese war effort. In short, 
an armed attack was considered to have “occurred” at a time it was evident 
an attack was going to take place in the near future, even though this was 
well before any forces ever crossed the frontier, or even concrete 
measures—as opposed to preparations—had been taken to initiate an at-
tack against Dutch-administered territory. That is the definition of anticipa-
tory self-defense as it comes to current international law from the Caroline 
formula; it is essentially taking action within the last feasible “window of 
opportunity” once the intention and capability to mount an attack have 
become clear.29 
Since the adoption of the Charter, there have been references by States 
to the existence of the right of anticipatory self-defense on various occa-
sions and in various contexts. While certain invocations have not met with 
general acceptance, others have. It is particularly noteworthy that no inter-
national court or tribunal, nor the Security Council, has ever ruled out re-
course to anticipatory self-defense within the general confines of the Caro-
line formula as a matter of law. For that matter, the General Assembly has 
never made any such pronouncement: neither in the well-known 1970 
                                                                                                                      
29. The clear distinction between self-defense, including warding off the manifest 
danger of impending attack, and preventive self-defense (which is a contradiction in terms 
since it is based on the mere belief that an attack might possibly occur at some indeterminate 
point in the future and might possibly be directed against an indeterminate target State) is the 
existence of a necessity to act when no feasible sufficient alternatives to defensive force 
are available. The principles of necessity and immediacy are what set self-defense apart 
from other uses of force. In this context, necessity and immediacy do not necessarily 
translate into a specific time period in which a State faced with the clear and present dan-
ger of an impending attack must act, but they must be seen in context and are tied to the 
lack of feasible alternatives. While, in general, the longer the period before an attack is 
launched the less likely it is that there will be no feasible alternatives, this is not always the 
case as is demonstrated in, inter alia, the Dutch declaration of war against Japan, where the 
intention and capability to conduct an attack were clear and convincing. For the concept 
of the “last window of opportunity,” see, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 3, rules 14 & 











“Friendly Relations” declaration, which restated and interpreted the basic 
principles of the Charter, nor in the 1974 “Definition of Aggression” decla-
ration, which serves as the basis for the definition of the crime of aggres-
sion in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.30  
In addition, the well-respected Institut de Droit International and the High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which advised the UN 
Secretary-General in 2004, have taken the position that anticipatory self-
defense within the parameters of the Caroline criteria is permissible under 
contemporary international law.31 
In conclusion, there is ample evidence that the right of self-defense 
contained an anticipatory element at the time the Charter was adopted and 
that it continues to do so now. In the absence of conclusive evidence that 
the law has been altered since the Charter entered into force, there is no 
reason to assume that anticipatory self-defense when exercised within the 
confines of the Caroline criteria has become unlawful. 
 
III. ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENSE AND A CYBER ARMED ATTACK 
 
A. Cyber Armed Attack: Likelihood and Possible Modalities 
 
Having set out the applicable legal framework in the previous section, we 
will now proceed to apply it to a cyber attack that rises to the level of an 
armed attack in a legal sense. Two things should be pointed out at the out-
set. First, the term “cyber attack,” as it is widely used in the media and by 
members of the cyber community, is not necessarily synonymous with the 
notion of armed attack under the international law of self-defense. In the 
vast majority of cases, incidents referred to as a “cyber attack” have not 
constituted a use of force, much less one rising to the threshold of an 
armed attack. The denial-of-service “attack” on Estonia in 2007, which re-
sulted in a few hours of disruption and inconvenience, and numerous ex-
amples of cyber break-ins, espionage, sabotage and theft of data and intel-
                                                                                                                      
30. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970); Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 
3314 (XXIX), U.N.  Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974), Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
31. High-Level Panel, supra note 24,  ¶¶ 188, 54 (Dec. 2, 2004); W. Michael Reisman, 
Report, Tenth Commission, Present Problems of the Use of Armed Force in International Law, 72 













lectual property constitute neither a use of force nor an armed attack.32 In-
deed, it is very probable that no breach of cyber security loosely referred to 
as a “cyber attack” has to date reached the level of an armed attack in a le-
gal sense.33 That is our position, since, to our knowledge, none has been so 
regarded in State practice and none has resulted in death, injury or signifi-
cant long-term material damage to critical infrastructure on which the func-
tioning of a State depends. The only example that might be viewed other-
wise is Operation Olympic Games,34 or Myrtus as it was also known,35 the 
Stuxnet cyber attack on the Iranian nuclear weapons program during the 
period 2008–10 that reportedly caused a measure of physical damage to the 
centrifuges engaged in the enhancement of nuclear material.36 While this 
may be an arguable example of an armed attack, in our view it is better 
treated as an example of mere sabotage not amounting to an armed attack, 
since it neither resulted in physical injury or death to persons, and the dam-
age had no wider, long-term or serious secondary effects beyond apparent-
ly delaying the progress of the Iranian nuclear program for several months.  
This could hardly be deemed to constitute critical infrastructure37 damage 
seriously impairing the functioning of the State or the stability of Iranian 
society. 
 
1. Stand-alone Cyber Attack 
 
Second, while the possibility of a stand-alone cyber attack, that is, one not 
occurring in conjunction with an attack employing traditional kinetic force, 
rising to the level of an armed attack cannot be ruled out, it is not in our 
                                                                                                                      
32. For an overview, see, e.g., Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 JOUR-
NAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 1, 5–32 (2012) reprinted in CYBER WARFARE: CRITICAL PER-
SPECTIVES, supra note 2, ch. 4. 
33. Id. at 75. 
34. DAVID SANGER, CONFRONT, & CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRIS-
ING USE OF AMERICAN POWER (2012). 
35. Rid, supra note 32, at 85. 
36. See, e.g., David P. Fidler, Was Stuxnet an Act of War? Decoding a Cyberattack, 9 IEEE 
SECURITY AND PRIVACY MAGAZINE 4, 56–59 (2011); Michael.J. Gross, A Declaration of 
Cyber-War, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2011, at 152, available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/04/stuxnet-201104.print. 
37. Iran is not dependent on nuclear energy. According to the CIA World Factbook, 
Iran’s electricity consumption is generated from fossil fuels (86.1%) and hydroelectric 
plants (13.7%). CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html (last visited 











view the most likely form of attack.38 The majority of potential cyber at-
tacks are not likely to cause physical casualties or significantly degrade a 
State’s critical infrastructure for a significant period of time, although un-
deniably some could have that capability. The exaggerations of so-called 
“cyber doom scenarios” have been compared to air-power theorists prior 
to and during World War II, who took the position that strategic bombing 
on its own could bring about the complete destruction of a State and its 
social fabric. They have also been attributed to the psychological aftermath 
of the 9-11 attack and to longstanding inchoate fears of technology and its 
potential effects that predate the digital age, but which have gained new 
adherents as the result of the dependency of contemporary society on digi-
tal systems.39  
Be that as it may, no cyber attack on its own has to date constituted an 
armed attack. While the possibility of a cyber armed attack can and should 
not as a matter of prudence be ruled out, it should not be confused with 
real cyber security threats that do take place on an ongoing and regular ba-
sis in the form of cyber espionage, cyber sabotage and cyber criminal activi-
ty aimed at both public and private computer systems. However, as serious 
as these threats may be to a State’s national and economic security, they do 
not constitute armed attacks that would justify the use of force in self-
defense.  
Only cyber attacks having direct secondary effects resulting in physical 
casualties, substantial physical damage, or such substantial and long-term 
damage to critical infrastructure that the carrying out of a State’s essential 
functions or its social and political stability are seriously impaired should, 
we submit, be treated as armed attack in the sense of the law relating to the 
exercise of self-defense. While an attack of this magnitude is feasible and 
                                                                                                                      
38. In general, a cyber sabotage attack against the supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) system of chemical plants, could result in damage, e.g., the leakage of 
poisonous gasses. There is a potential for a more serious incident when plants are situated 
closely to densely populated areas, as is the case in the Netherlands where Royal Dutch 
Shell’s chemical installations are close to the port and city of Rotterdam.  According to 
Rose Tsang, however, “it is unlikely such an [intentional] attack [by an individual or small 
group of individuals] would result in a wide-scale failure of the critical infrastructure.” 
Rose Tsang, Cyberthreats, Vulnerabilities and Attacks on SCADA Networks 21 (University of 
California, Goldman School of Public Policy, Working Paper, 2009). 
39. See Sean Lawson, Beyond Cyber Doom—Cyber Attack Scenarios and the Evidence of His-
tory, 10 JOURNAL OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & POLITICS 1, 4 (2013), reprinted in 













cannot be wholly discounted, the unlikelihood of it occurring should be 
kept in mind.40  
 
2. Combined Attack: Cyber Operations and Kinetic Attack 
 
If stand-alone cyber armed attacks are probably less likely to occur than is 
sometimes conjectured, what other options are there? In our view, the 
most likely is an armed attack involving cyber operations carried out in 
conjunction with a traditional use of kinetic armed force. There are two 
known instances where this has occurred.  
One was during the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in Au-
gust 2008, when Georgia initiated armed action against South Ossetian 
separatists and Russia intervened militarily, forcing the Georgian armed 
forces to withdraw.41 For purposes of this article, we are not concerned 
with the legality of the use of force by either side to the conflict, rather our 
focus is on the cyber operations conducted by Russian State agencies 
and/or supportive patriotic hackers (there was no clear evidence as to who 
was responsible).  These were limited in effect and duration and did not 
constitute an armed attack. If, however, they had gone beyond mere defac-
ing of government websites and inconveniencing the public and certain 
public bodies, to, e.g., support military operations by degrading or neutral-
izing weapons and military communications systems, in that case they 
would have constituted armed attacks. If used in such a manner, it would 
have been part of an overall armed attack involving the use of traditional 
military force that included the employment of cyber techniques as an ad-
junct to, or preparation for, the kinetic attack.  
That is what apparently occurred in Operation Orchard, when Israel 
carried out an airstrike against the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in northern Syr-
ia in September 2007.42 The airstrike was seemingly accompanied by the 
                                                                                                                      
40. The authors share the view expressed by Tsang, supra note 38. 
41. See ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCI-
DENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (2010); Keir Giles, “Information Troops”—a Russian Cyber 
Command?, in 3RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT 45, 46 (Christian 
Czosseck, Enn Tyugu & Thomas Wingfield eds., 2011).  
42. Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Israel's Airstrike on Syria's Al-Kibar Facility: a Test Case 
for the Doctrine of Pre-Emptive Self-Defence?, 16 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 
263 (2011). Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Joshua D. Goodman, The Attack on Syria's al-Kibar 












use of cyber electronic warfare that reportedly neutralized the Syrian air 
defense system and enabled the airstrike to be carried out successfully.43 
Again, without addressing the question of whether this act was a lawful ex-
ercise of self-defense, it is a clear illustration of an armed attack in which 
cyber capabilities were used alongside traditional kinetic armed force as a 
means of “preparing the battlefield,” thereby creating favorable circum-
stances for the overall success of the operation. This type of cyber opera-
tion will almost inevitably become more prevalent as more States obtain 
the capacity to effectively utilize cyber as an adjunct to traditional kinetic 
force and integrate it into their operational doctrine and practice.44 Armed 
forces will start—as some have already started—to ensure a coherent inte-
gration of cyber capabilities across the spectrum of military operations.45 
In our view, the combination of cyber and kinetic attacks is a far more 
likely scenario than a stand-alone cyber armed attack. There are several rea-
sons why a stand-alone cyber attack rising to the level of an armed attack is 
considerably less likely than a combined attack.  
On the one hand, if the attack were part of a large-scale offensive 
comprising a concerted series of attacks, it is unlikely that the attacking 
State would rely solely on one particular form of attack. A stand-alone 
“cyber Pearl Harbor” scenario is, therefore, highly unlikely, since an attack 
on that scale as the opening move in a full-scale war would inevitably trig-
ger a large-scale kinetic response. Thus, it would make little sense to limit 
the initial attack to a cyber attack. If a State, having decided to go to war, 
employed cyber in such a large-scale attack that it amounted to the com-
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mencement of the war, it would most likely be in conjunction with other 
means of attack to ensure the maximum effect was realized.46 
If, on the other hand, a cyber operation was employed against a single 
discrete target, it would more than likely take the form of either an act of 
cyber espionage or sabotage below the threshold of armed attack, as in the 
Stuxnet scenario, or be used in support of a kinetic attack if the intention 
was to destroy the target, as was the case with the 2007 Israeli airstrike on 
the Al-Kibar nuclear facility. A stand-alone cyber attack that actually caused 
a significant degree of physical damage to an installation or resulted in hu-
man casualties, thereby constituting an armed attack, would not necessarily 
destroy a target.  
Moreover, using cyber alone as a means of inflicting significant physical 
damage or substantial loss of life would almost certainly increase the risk of 
miscalculation and escalation, because of the degree of unpredictability and 
relative anonymity of a cyber attack. Additionally, the probable psychologi-
cal impact of an attack on one specific target would seem senseless for po-
litical and military purposes or in legal terms, assuming these mattered to 
the actor involved. A more likely course of action in a cyber operation in-
tended to degrade a particular target would be to stay below the threshold 
of an armed attack, thereby allowing an actor that wished to degrade a par-
ticular target to do so with much less risk of a forcible response and to 
maintain denial of direct involvement, as was the case with Stuxnet.  In 
sum, if the desired end state was destruction of a target, cyber would not be 
the method of attack most guaranteed to succeed, while if the objective 
was merely to obtain information or degrade a target without destroying it 
and risking escalation, it would not require a cyber attack that rose to the 
level of an armed attack.  
 
3. Rational Actor 
 
Of course, this discussion has assumed the actor is reasonabe and acts with 
rational motives and objectives, whether they are legal or illegal. The pro-
verbial “genie in the bottle” is, of course, a large-scale act of cyber terror-
ism that has the potential effect of causing massive loss of life or physical 
destruction. Examples often used are attacks on a nuclear power plant 
aimed at shutting down its cooling system and causing a Fukushima-type 
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disaster, on an air traffic control system with the objective of causing a 
large number of aircraft to crash and on a flood control system triggering a 
massive and disastrous flood.47 An attack such as one of those carried out 
by a nihilistic actor, e.g., Al Qaeda or one of its affiliates that had no regard 
for the consequences is potentially more plausible than an attack of this 
nature conducted by a State.  Such an attack would undoubtedly rise to the 
level of an armed attack and it would not necessarily be part of the more 
comprehensive armed offensive that a State would be likely to employ.  
A cyber “Armageddon” is not, however, as likely as sometimes sug-
gested.48 First, conducting a cyber armed attack on this scale is not readily 
within the capabilities of non-State organizations and obtaining the capabil-
ity to do so is not easily accomplished. It would require a major effort, in-
volving considerable time, technical and trained human resources, and 
probably the support of a State with sophisticated cyber capability for a 
terrorist organization to develop the capacity to achieve devastating results 
through the use of cyber alone. Second, the logical question is why a terror-
ist organization would make that effort when there are other more achiev-
able means to produce similar results. Al Qaeda did not have to take over 
the air traffic control center at Kennedy International Airport in New York 
City to achieve the effect it did on 9-11. Instead it seized physical control 
of four aircraft, a capability more likely for a terrorist organization to pos-
sess than that necessary to initiate a major cyber attack.  Nevertheless, alt-
hough not likely, a major attack is feasible and the possibility of a terrorist 
organization obtaining the necessary capacity to conduct such an attack 
should not be discounted.  
 
B. Responding to an Anticipated Cyber Armed Attack in Conformity with the Law 
 
Having explored the likelihood of a cyber attack constituting an armed at-
tack when conducted either in conjunction with the use of traditional kinet-
ic military force or as a stand-alone attack, we next turn to an assessment of 
the manner in which the legal framework governing the exercise of the 
right of self-defense addressed in Section II would be applied in responding 
to a clear threat of a such an attack. We will do so on the basis of the con-
clusion reached previously that anticipatory self-defense is a lawful exercise 
of the right of self-defense when exercised in response to a manifest and 
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unequivocal imminent threat of attack in the proximate future against a 
designated target State or States, as these criteria are laid down in the Char-
ter and are contained in customary international law. 
 
1. Combined Cyber and Kinetic Attacks 
 
With regard to what we consider to be the most likely mode of cyber 
armed attack, namely, that occurring in conjunction with the use of kinetic 
force, there are no real differences from the manner in which the criteria 
for the exercise of anticipatory self-defense are applied to traditional means 
and methods of attack conducted without the use of cyber. The assessment 
of the likelihood of an imminent attack and the identification of the author 
of the attack, both based on credible evidence, and the gauging of a pro-
portionate response would not differ in any meaningful way. 
For example, if State A was clearly on the point of launching an attack 
against State B, and State B responded by launching a preemptive airstrike 
that destroyed a considerable portion of State A’s air capability on the 
ground and command and control functions before the attack was 
launched, thereby gaining air superiority, it would make little or no differ-
ence whether either the attacking State A and/or defending State B em-
ployed or did not employ cyber weapons or techniques to assist their oper-
ations in terms of assessing the legality of the response.  
The questions concerning the legality of the anticipatory response 
would be exactly the same with or without the use of cyber by either State. 
Was the evidence of an imminent attack credible? Were there available al-
ternatives under the circumstances? Did the defender strike within the last 
feasible window of opportunity? Was the strike precipitate, therefore 
premature, because it was conducted before the evidence of attack was 
clear, before alternatives to the use of force were exhausted or before a de-
termination was made that possible alternatives were not feasible under the 
circumstances? Was the response proportionate in relation to the reasona-
ble evidence of the scope and nature of the threat?  
The use of cyber weapons in such a scenario would have little or no in-
fluence on the answers to these questions and would, therefore, have 
equally little bearing on whether the response was in conformity with the 
law or not. In short, when cyber is employed alongside other means and 
methods of warfare, it will not significantly affect the outcome of an as-
sessment of a preemptive response as a lawful or unlawful act of anticipa-











The problem of identification of the potential attacker would not be 
increased if cyber weapons and techniques were employed in the attack 
since evidence of those preparations would be weighed together with phys-
ical indications of an impending attack. In fact, cyber activities might make 
identification of the attacking party easier if, for example, previous cyber 
espionage probes of the defending State’s capabilities and deployments 
could be traced back to a State now demonstrating clear indications of 
preparation for an attack. This would be no different, in principle, from the 
use of electronic warfare techniques to intercept and decode messages indi-
cating an attacking party’s intentions. 
  
2. Stand-alone Cyber Attack 
 
In contrast to the cyber attack undertaken in conjunction with a kinetic 
attack, preparations for a stand-alone cyber attack would, in most cases, 
significantly affect the ability to act in anticipatory self-defense. To illus-
trate, assume actor A (a State or non-State actor) is on the point of launch-
ing the attack against State B and that State B is able to determine a digital 
attack on its critical infrastructure is being prepared. State B’s right to 
launch a preemptive digital and/or kinetic defensive response in accord-
ance with the criteria for the lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense 
would depend entirely on its capacity to identify the prospective attacker 
and ascertain the attacking party’s intentions and capabilities. In the ab-
sence of physical indicators, such as force deployments, aerial reconnais-
sance and intercepted communications, it would be exceedingly difficult, if 
not impossible, for a prospective target State to be able to identify the at-
tacking party, ascertain the existence and nature of the threat, and gauge 
the necessary and proportionate response with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. 
 
3. Accumulation of Events 
 
There may be situations in which it is feasible for a State to determine the 
origin of an attack, perhaps because of reliable human or other intelligence, 
or other clear evidence, such as positive identification of the source of a 
prior attempt to carry out a similar, partially unsuccessful cyber attack. In 
that situation, the response would not be wholly anticipatory, since the at-
tempted attack could be considered as continuing.  This analysis would also 













digital attacks from the same source falling below the threshold of armed 
attacks that occur over a reasonably connected span of time—for example, 
a series of small-scale attacks to ascertain a defending State’s vulnerabilities 
and capabilities.  These attacks, taken together, comprise an attack of suffi-
cient gravity to qualify as an armed attack justifying an exercise of self-
defense to ward off the phased attacks and neutralize the threat of further 
attack.  
Responding in self-defense to these small-scale digital attacks repre-
sents an application of the “accumulation of events” theory to a “Nadel-
stichtaktik” form of armed attack.49 The defensive response in such a sce-
nario would have both a reactive and anticipatory element, with the former 
predominating since it would be reacting to an ongoing attack, but it would 
also be forward looking by warding off further attack. 
The importance of the anticipatory element would increase if the series 
of prior small-scale attacks clearly indicated a large-scale digital attack was 
imminent. In that case, a defensive response at the last window of oppor-
tunity before the attacker had completed preparations for launching the 
attack would qualify as an exercise of anticipatory self-defense. Whether it 
would qualify as a lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense would de-
pend on the credibility, reliability and sufficiency of the evidence and the 
absence of feasible alternatives, as well as the effort taken to ensure the re-
sponse was proportionate to the threat. 
 
4. Identification of the Author and the Threat  
 
Probably the single greatest obstacle to the exercise of anticipatory self-
defense in response to a stand-alone cyber armed attack is identification of 
the attacking party. A lawful exercise of anticipatory self-defense is an op-
tion only if reliable intelligence or other evidentiary factors enable the de-
fending State to identify the prospective attacker and the nature and scope 
of the threat posed. The cyber domain is different from the physical one in 
a number of ways, but the one which is crucial in this respect is the relative 
degree of anonymity possessed by a prospective attacking party acting 
wholly within the cyber domain. 
While the problem of identification of both the identity of the attacking 
party and the nature of the threat posed is real and substantial, it is not 
necessarily impossible to do so in at least some situations.  
                                                                                                                      











First, it may be possible to “hack-back” to obtain at least a preliminary 
indication where the attack originated. This will not necessarily be conclu-
sive.  Data travels over an entire network of connections and splits into 
data packages that traverse various geographic points and nodules. Even if 
the point of origin could be identified, the geographic source of a digital 
attack does not necessarily indicate the identity of the attacking party; it 
simply shows the data’s originating location. If a digital attack utilized a so-
called “botnet,” of which there are many on the Internet, it would probably 
be unclear initially as to who or what was behind the attack, although this 
could become clearer after further investigation. However, any forcible re-
sponse after the elapse of time required to establish the identity of the at-
tacker would, in these circumstances, no longer be anticipatory. A more 
feasible alternative is prevention of the attack through the dismantling of 
botnets before they could be employed on the scale of an armed attack.50  
That problem could be partially overcome by the fact that there are—at 
least at present and in the reasonably near future—relatively few States and 
even fewer, if any, non-State actors capable of mounting a wholly digital 
attack rising to the level of an armed attack, particularly one with potential-
ly devastating consequences. This narrows the number of potential authors 
considerably, thereby making a positive identification of the source of the 
incipient attack more feasible.  
Even with this narrowing, however, identifying the source of an incipi-
ent attack and determining the nature and scale of the threat pose signifi-
cant, but not necessarily insurmountable, obstacles to the exercise of a law-
ful preemptive response when other more specific evidence of authorship 
is not present.  
 
5. Preemptive Response 
 
In sum, while anticipatory self-defense in response to an incipient armed 
attack that will employ both kinetic and cyber weapons and techniques is 
not substantially different from situations in which cyber operations are not 
part of the attack, there are significant obstacles to its exercise in reaction 
to a potential stand-alone cyber armed attack in the absence of clear intelli-
gence or other factors enabling the defending State to identify the nature 
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and source of the attack. In some cases, there will be sufficient information 
to permit an anticipatory defensive response, but in others—perhaps the 
majority—there will not. This is a fact with which policy makers and mili-
tary commanders must learn to live. There is, after all, no such thing as per-
fect security in the physical world either; surprise attacks have been carried 
out with varying degrees of success throughout military history. 
This relative degree of uncertainty and the obstacles posed to the lawful 
exercise of anticipatory self-defense from a stand-alone cyber armed attack 
are real and cannot be wished away, but these factors do not preclude such 
action when they can be overcome and when other alternatives are neither 
feasible nor adequate to address the threat.  
This uncertainty and these obstacles provide no reason to panic and 
certainly do not justify a weakening or changing of the law with regard to 
the exercise of anticipatory self-defense. Anticipatory self-defense is not 
frequently employed in the physical domain, with only a relatively few in-
stances of it being exercised in response to more traditional modes of at-
tack.51  There is no reason why this should be different in the digital con-
text.  
Improvement of measures to enhance cyber security of vital military 
and civilian systems and the possession of adequate means of cyber de-
fense, including the potential to carry out credible and effective cyber intel-
ligence, will go far towards deterring a potential attack and limiting the ef-
fects of one, should it occur. Likewise, as stated earlier, the nature and 
scope of the threat of cyber attack should be kept in perspective; over reli-
ance on preemption is not necessarily a way to increase cyber security. To 
the contrary, if used without proper attention to the well-established legal 
criteria governing the exercise of anticipatory self-defense, it could well in-
crease the degree of “cyber insecurity” and needlessly escalate situations on 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have detailed our reasons for concluding that the present legal frame-
work governing the exercise of the right of self-defense is both relevant 
and applicable to cyber armed attacks. That framework provides a right of 
self-defense in response to either an ongoing or imminent armed attack 
within the conditions laid out in the UN Charter and under customary in-
ternational law. The criteria of the Charter and customary law are comple-
mentary and apply to any invocation of the right of self-defense. This legal 
framework has long recognized the right to exercise anticipatory self-
defense in response to a manifest and unequivocal threat of attack in the 
proximate future, within the general parameters of necessity, proportionali-
ty and immediacy. There is no reason to conclude the Charter eliminated 
this long-standing preexisting right. Anticipatory self-defense continues to 
be in force in the contemporary legal order as an intrinsic part of the larger 
notion of self-defense. 
Anticipatory self-defense does not, however, permit so-called “preven-
tive self-defense,” i.e., the reaction to mere potential threats of attack that 
may or may not crystallize at some indeterminate point in the future, or 
action taken in the absence of credible evidence that an attack is imminent 
and establishing who or what is responsible. 
Anticipatory self-defense includes the possibility of responding to an 
imminent armed attack that is wholly or partially conducted within the digi-
tal domain, provided the attack to be conducted would be on a comparable 
scale and have similar effects to a traditional kinetic attack carried out by a 
State. This would include situations where a cyber armed attack had the 
intended effect of resulting in more than nominal human casualties or caus-
ing significant physical damage and destruction through the direct second-
ary consequences of the digital attack. Additionally, in our opinion in those 
cases where the attack causes no direct physical effects, but where long-
term, serious damage to digital systems controlling a State’s critical infra-
structure or essential functions resulted or was clearly intended, such action 
could constitute an armed attack justifying the exercise of self-defense 
when the damage was not capable of being remedied within a reasonable 
timeframe and the stability of a State and its society were seriously threat-
ened. 
In our view, anticipatory self-defense may be carried out in response to 
an imminent digital armed attack irrespective of whether the attack is con-













trol, or with the substantial involvement, of a State; or (3) by a non-State 
actor acting alone.   
We examined the probable modes by which an incipient cyber armed 
attack could be conducted and concluded that there are basically two 
modes. First, and increasingly the most likely, is in preparation for, or ad-
junct to, a traditional kinetic armed attack.  In this case, the scope of a pos-
sible anticipatory defensive response would not be significantly affected, 
since it would be assessed in tandem with other physical indications of an 
impending attack. Second, a stand-alone cyber armed attack could occur 
justifying a proportionate anticipatory exercise of self-defense.  
For a number of reasons, however, the stand-alone cyber attack is less 
likely to occur and less likely to warrant an anticipatory defensive response. 
First, most stand-alone cyber attacks fall well below the threshold of armed 
attack, which would preclude a use of force in self-defense. Second, even in 
cases where the level of the attack does reach the requisite legal threshold, 
in many—probably most—cases there will be insufficient knowledge of the 
author of the attack and its probable scope and intended effects to enable a 
reasonably accurate assessment of which State or non-State actor is respon-
sible and to gauge the appropriate defensive response within the parame-
ters of necessity and proportionality. Nevertheless, there could be limited 
situations in which sufficient information is available to enable a lawful 
preemptive defensive response to a stand-alone cyber attack. Although this 
option will not be available in many, indeed, probably most situations, that 
reality should not lead to panic and overreaction, or be used as justification 
for “bending the rules.” Cyber attack is unlikely in most cases to require 
the exercise of self-defense.  Even when it does, anticipatory self-defense is 
not necessarily the only or most appropriate response. Its use will be lim-
ited to those instances when it can be carried out with the least possible 
danger of miscalculation and when no other alternatives are feasible.  
There are means other than the exercise of anticipatory self-defense in 
which cyber security can and should be improved and the effects of a po-
tential attack deterred or limited.  Overreaction or overreliance on preemp-
tion would be more likely to increase, rather than decrease, the level of 
“cyber insecurity.” It would also undermine the legal framework for the use 
of force at great cost to all members of the international community. 
 
 
